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THE PERILS OF TREATY INTERPRETATION 
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Abstract: 
The article investigates the interpretative practice of investment tribunals in the light of 
Wittgenstein‟s theory on rule following and usage, to advance the hypothesis that arbitral 
tribunals run the risk to interpret the language of the treaties so as to effect a deracination of their 
terms. In order to do so, the article employs Vladimir Nabokov‟s reflections on the perils of 
translation, contextually arguing that the incorporation in investment treaties of language 
developed in specific domestic frameworks (i.e. United States‟ constitutional jurisprudence) is an 
example of semantic hegemony accompanied by hermeneutic conformity on the part of tribunals.  
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The meaning of a word is its use in the language. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein
1
 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The Russian novelist Vladimir Nabokov wrote an insightful article on the perils of literary 
translation, where he described the „three grades of evil‟ that can befall a translation:  
 
Three grades of evil can be discerned in the queer world of verbal transmigration. The first, 
and lesser one, comprises obvious errors due to ignorance or misguided knowledge. This is 
mere human frailty and thus excusable. The next step to Hell is taken by the translator who 
intentionally skips words or passages that he does not bother to understand or that might 
seem obscure or obscene to vaguely imagined readers; he accepts the blank look that his 
dictionary gives him without any qualms; or subjects scholarship to primness: he is as 
ready to know less than the author as he is to think he knows better. The third, and worst, 
degree of turpitude is reached when a masterpiece is planished and patted into such a 
shape, vilely beautified in such a fashion as to conform to the notions and prejudices of a 
given public. This is a crime, to be punished by the stocks as plagiarists were in the 
shoebuckle days. 
  
In this article, I use Nabokov‟s taxonomy of evil to analyse investment arbitration awards, 
focusing on the third grade described by Nabokov as the worst, that he ascribes to the sin of 
conformity (as opposed to first two, which can be summarised as ignorance and malicious 
ignorance).  
                                                     
1
 LWittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, 1968) [1953] para. 43. 
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A considerable number of international investment arbitrations is based on treaties;
2
 their 
interpretation by tribunals is a form of translation, as law possesses its own language, and its 
interpretation is both an exercise of application of the abstract norm to the concrete case, and a 
form of exegesis of the legal text.
3
The interpretation of treaties is regulated by the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), signed in 1969 and entered into force in 1980, but 
applicable to treaties generally, at least in its main provisions as recognised to be customary 
international law. Investment tribunals have been accused of paying „lip service‟ to the VCLT‟s 
general rule of treaty interpretation as expressed in its Article 31.
4
 This article argues that Article 
31 leaves too much scope to the dangers of conformity to the notions and prejudices, not of the 
public at large, which was the concern of Nabokov as a novelist, but of the restricted public of 
investment arbitrations on the one hand, and of the arbitrators themselves on the other. 
Contextually, I will also argue that the incorporation in investment treaties of language developed 
in specific domestic frameworks (i.e. United States‟ constitutional jurisprudence) is an example 
of semantic hegemony accompanied by hermeneutic conformity on the part of tribunals. In order 
to develop this argument, I will employ Wittgenstein‟s reflections on rule following and usage, to 
advance the hypothesis that arbitral tribunals run the risk to interpret the language of the treaties 
so as to effect a deracination of their terms.  
 
Section Two of the article provides an outline of interpretative practice in investment tribunals; in 
Section Three, the theoretical argument is presented, while Section Four is dedicated to a case 
study, the text of the Expropriation Annex in the United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(BIT). Finally, Section Five offers some concluding remarks. 
 
B. The investment dispute settlement system and the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 
 
Investment disputes originate from a claim, normally by the investor,
5
 of a breach of the 
investment contract or treaty; investment tribunals are then directed to solve the dispute according 
                                                     
2
 For recent information about the volume of investment arbitrations, see UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note – 
Recent Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), No. 1 (April 2014). The ICSID 
Secretariat provides numbers of their arbitrations on their website, https (last visited 31 October 2014), 
under the heading „ICSID Caseload Statistics.‟ The interpretation of multilingual treaties draws an even 
closer analogy, where legal exegesis is weighed down by the perils of cultural contingency.  
3
 On treaty and legal interpretation, seen from a comparative perspective, see DF Vagts, „Treaty 
Interpretation and the New American Ways of Law Reading‟ 4 European Journal of International Law 
(1993)472 (with further bibliography); a more focussed treatment within investment law in M Waibel, 
„International Investment Law and Treaty Interpretation,‟ in R Hoffmann and C Tams, From Clinical 
Isolation to Systemic Integration (Nomos, 2011) 29. On the „art of interpretation,‟ see recently J Klabbers, 
„Virtuous Interpretation,‟ in M Fitzmaurice, O Elias & P Merkouris (eds), Treaty Interpretation and the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years On (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 17. 
4
 T Wälde, „Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples‟, in C Binder, U Kriebaum, A 
Reinisch & S Wittich, International Investment Law for the 21
st
 Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph 
Schreuer (Oxford University Press, 2009) 725, 728. 
5
 There have been so far only two disputes where the investor was the defendant; see Republic of 
Equatorial Guinea v. CMS Energy Corporation and Others, ICSID Case No. CONC(AF)/12/2; and Gabon 
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to the applicable law, including the treaty or contract and other sources contained in the relative 
contractual or treaty clause; when there is no agreement between the parties on the governing law 
of the dispute, tribunals will usually apply the law of the host country, plus the rules and 
principles of international law applicable in the relation between the parties.
6
 While tribunals are 
bound to apply a certain set of rules and are limited in their jurisdiction by the instrument 
applicable to the dispute, they normally enjoy more leeway in the interpretative approach 
adopted.
7
 Their interpretative freedom is nonetheless limited by the conditions set by the 
applicable treaty and by general rules of international law. As International Investment 
Agreements (IIAs) are instruments of public international law, they are to be interpreted by 
arbitration tribunals in accordance to the main rule of interpretation codified in the VCLT,
8
 and, 
as appropriate, to other interpretative principles derived from domestic legal systems and 
recognised as principles of international law.
9
 Article 31 VCLT provides as follows: 
 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to 
the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
 (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
 (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the 
treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
 (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty 
or the application of its provisions; 
 (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
 (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended.
10
 
                                                                                                                                                              
v. Société Serete SA, ICSID Case No. ARB/76/1. There are also cases where states asserted a 
counterclaim, which are not included here. 
6
 See for example Article 42 ICSID Convention. T Bagic, Applicable Law in International Investment 
Disputes (Eleven International Publishing, 2005). 
7
 See OK Fauchald, „The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis, 19(2) European 
Journal of International Law (2008) 301.   
8
 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331. Many investment tribunals, but by all 
means not all, refer to the rules codified in the VCLT at the outset of their interpretative work; see for 
example Phoenix Action Ltd v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award 15 April 2009, paras 
75-77 and especially Hrvatska Elektroprivreda dd v. Republic of Slovenia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, 
Decision on the Treaty Interpretation Issue, 12 June 2009, (Hrvatska Elektroprivreda) Chapter V 
(Relevant Principles of Treaty Interpretation). 
9
 Wälde (2009). 
10
 Article 32 provides for supplementary means of interpretation on limited grounds: „Recourse may be had 
to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 
31,or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
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The general rule in Article 31 VCLT provides a holistic approach (or one could say, a 
compromise) to treaty interpretation that subsumes the three main canons, textual, teleological 
and purposive.
11
 As noted by the Aguas del Tunari Tribunal, 
 
Interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is a process of progressive encirclement 
where the interpreter starts under the general rule with the (1) ordinary meaning of the terms of 
the treaty, (2) in their context and (3) in light of the treaty‟s object and purpose, and by cycling 
through this three step inquiry iteratively closes in upon the proper interpretation.‟12 
 
The focus of this article points to the dichotomy between textual and teleological interpretation as 
the most apt at unmasking the ways in which language interfaces with political and legal 
meanings (incidentally, the dichotomy between teleological and purposive serves the same 
function in stressing the tension between a progressive and an originalist interpretation of the 
same text). This dichotomy however does not account for a further tension in investment 
arbitration between a commercial approach to dispute resolution and a public (international) law 
approach.
13
The epistemic community of investment arbitrators is formed largely by professionals 
trained in the world of commercial arbitration, where the approach to dispute resolution is 
characterised by a focus on procedure and the facts and limited engagement with legal analysis, 
including of the authorities and context.However, the choice is not always so simple; for 
example, Jan Paulsson in his Separate Opinion in the Hrvatska Elektroprivreda Arbitration, 
noted how an extreme teleological approach can be put at the service of a commercial bias well 
beyond the text of the treaty: 
 
The permissible context is the context of the terms of the treaty and not the context of the 
treaty generally, in the way desired by the “total context” proponents. This is precisely 
how the textualist approach carried the day when the VCLT was signed in 1969. […]As far 
as I can discern, the minority‟s Decision proceeds in ignorance of this fundamental and 
much-discussed constraint on the freedom of international judges and arbitrators to 
interpret treaties. […] They seem to ignore that they are allowed to refer only to the context 
of the terms of the Treaty, i.e. the internal consistency of the text as one whole. This 
fundamental error, it seems, has freed the majority to impose its vision of commercial 
                                                                                                                                                              
 (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
 (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.‟ 
11
 Article 31(1): „A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose‟. See most recently R 
Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 2008) 8 and 33 ff.  The singular „rule‟ points to 
the unitary character of the process of interpretation, rather than restricting the number of rules or principles 
of interpretation. 
12
Aguas del Tunari SA v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent‟s 
Objections to Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, para. 91. See also Hrvatska Elektroprivreda. The ILC, in 
its Commentary on the Draft Articles on Interpretation, put it this way: „All the various elements, as they 
were present in any given case, would be thrown into the crucible, and their interaction would give the 
legally relevant interpretation.‟ United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties: Official Records: 
Documents of the Conference, A/CONF39/11/Add.2, 39, para. 8. 
13
 See Wälde (2009) 725. 
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reasonableness on the entire history of Krsko NPP. This is not what States submit 
themselves to when concluding a Treaty. The majority‟s vision of commercial logic leads 
them to all manner of reading between the lines of the Treaty and of various more or less 
related, more or less contemporaneous, and more or less superseded documents.
14
 
 
This is almost ironic, as I have noted above how interpretative practice in commercial arbitrations 
tends to favour the textualist approach.
15
In fact, the Hrvatska Elektroprivreda Tribunal 
approvingly quoted a judgment in a commercial case decided in the English court, 
where Justice Simon stated:   
 
It is clear that the proper approach to the interpretation of Treaty wording is to identify 
what the words mean in their context (the textual method), rather than attempting to 
identify what may have been the underlying purpose in the use of the words (the 
teleological method).
16
 
 
And added:  
 
The proper approach is to interpret the agreed form of words which, objectively and in 
their proper context, bear an ascertainable meaning. This approach, no doubt reflecting the 
experience of centuries of diplomacy, leaves open the possibility that the parties might 
have dissimilar intentions and might wish to put different interpretations on what they had 
agreed. When considering the object and purpose of a treaty a court should be cautious 
about taking into account material which extends beyond what the contracting parties have 
agreed in the preamble or other common expressions of intent, see article 31.2(a) and (b).
17
 
 
The majority panel then declared to have reached the interpretation of the agreement between the 
Parties „as a result of construing the words of the 2001 Agreement as prescribed by Articles 31 
and 32 of the VCLT. Nothing more and nothing less.‟18 It also added, controversially, that „No 
greater or lesser force resides in a term by virtue of the relative magnitude of the clarity with 
                                                     
14
Hrvatska Elektroprivreda,Individual Opinion of Jan Paulsson, paras 44 ff. It should be noted though 
that this dispute is not based on a comprehensive IIA, but on a specific Governing Agreement signed in 
2001 by Croatia and Slovenia to solve certain issues related to the delivery of electricity produced by a 
nuclear power plant.  
15
It has been proposed that low legitimacyjudicial institutions, such as investment tribunals, tend to rely on 
literal textual interpretative strategies, while high legitimacy judicial institutions, such as permanent courts, 
tend to employ teleological interpretation more freely.Of course the legitimacy of the judiciary has 
generated an immense amount of scholarship. A more focused approach on investment tribunals, and one 
of the first to vocalise the „legitimacy crisis of investment arbitration, in SD Franck, „The Legitimacy Crisis 
in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions,‟ 73 
Fordham Law Review (2004-2005) 1521. This article does not take an explicit position on this distinction 
between high and low legitimacy institutions, but in any event it seems a bit of a circular argument, where 
the starting point in classifying the judicial bodies is crucial in analysing their interpretative strategies, and 
vice versa. 
16
Czech Republic v European Media Ventures SA [2008] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 531, para. 16. 
17
Ibidem, para. 19. 
18
Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, para. 176.  
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which it has been (or has not been) written.‟19As noted by Paulsson in his Individual Opinion, this 
statement would be „nothing less than revolutionary‟ if reflective of the reality of treaty 
interpretation.
20
 In fact, ever since Hart‟s remarks on the „open texture‟ of the law,21 the general 
agreement has been precisely the opposite, even if different consequences can flow from it.
22
 The 
over-reliance of the Tribunal on „contextual‟ arguments sensu lato (i.e., including not only 
reading the terms of a particular provision of the treaty in its context, as dictated by Article 31(1) 
VCLT but also, interpreting the treaty in its context, which, out with the conditions specified in 
Article 31(2) VCLT – agreements related to the treaty – should not include the general political, 
social and economic context of the treaty) allows the „commercial reasonableness‟ to win the 
day.
23
 The choice of this case seems counter-intuitive: here is an investment tribunal having 
recourse not to the textual interpretation associated with this sort of dispute resolution body, but 
to an extreme form of teleological interpretation. The crucial factor is that the Tribunal itself 
defends its interpretation as a proper exercise of textual interpretation („Nothing more and 
nothing less‟).  
 
Arguably, the distinction between interpretative approach is somewhat overstated, with the choice 
reflecting more the status of the decision-making body, rather than being dictated by it. In other 
words, any intepretative exercise can be successfully argued as being textual or teleologic, 
depending on the favoured approach in the community of belonging of the court of tribunal. 
Therefore, the justification of the approach is more revealing of the prejudices of that 
interpretative community (what it finds acceptable) than an accurate reflection of the work 
actually performed by the tribunal, as the previous case shows.
24
 
 
In order to frame the analysis of the case study properly, the next section will deal with the main 
thrust of the argument, taking inspiration from Nabokov‟s comments and Wittgenstein‟s 
reflections on interpretation and rule-following. 
 
 
C. Conformity and deracination: from Nabokov to Wittgenstein 
 
Treaty interpretation is undertaken by many different actors, at many levels. It is principally an 
activity undertaken by states in their role as masters of the treaty. So it is the parties themselves in 
                                                     
19
Hrvatska Elektroprivreda,ibidem. 
20
Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, Individual Opinion, para. 22.  
21
 These are discussed in more detail in the next Section. 
22
 Additionally to the literature cited in the next Section, see also B Bix, Law, Language and Legal 
Determinacy (Oxford University Press, 1995).  
23
 The contextual criteria of Article 31(3), including the notorious „relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties‟ listed at Article 3193)(c), are not strictly on the same level 
as the rule in Article 31(1), as apparent by the limitation of Article 31(3) incipit (There shall be taken into 
account). 
24
In the article, I do not necessarily problematise this distinction, but it is worth noting that several potential 
contradictions lay undisturbed at the basis of it. For example, the well-known effectivness principle (ut res 
magis valeat quam pereat) dictates that all terms of a legal text be given effective meaning. Now, there is 
an obvious tension between this and the highly ritualistic character of legal language, replete with 
repetitions and figures of speech such as hendiadys, metaphor etc. 
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the first instance who act as treaty interpreters in their executive, legislative and judicial practice 
and produce authoritative interpretations, when acting in concert with the other treaty parties. 
International courts and tribunals are duty-bound to take such interpretative utterances into 
account; equally, parties to the treaty are under an obligation to respect the terms of the treaty 
until and unless a different interpretation is agreed upon. This performative interpretation – i.e., 
the interpretation that is intrinsic to the implementation of the treaty by its parties – is other than 
the forensic interpretation required of courts and tribunal when there is a dispute as to the 
performance of the treaty. States also participate in forensic interpretation to the extent that they 
are parties not only to the treaties, but also to the judicial or arbitral proceedings that might arise 
from them.
25
 Before considering the consequences of this distinction, it might useful to point out 
a maybe banal point, i.e. that legal interpretation presents a crucial difference to literary 
interpretation, as it has to take into account the multiplicity of voices reflected in the legal text, 
which contrasts to the singularity of the authorial voice in a literary text. Domestic legislation 
contains parliamentary compromises and amendments; international treaties are by definition the 
result of, at the very least, a dialogue, and often, with multilateral treaties, a cacophony of 
contrasting voices. In fact, it could be argued that the clarity of a text is inversely proportional to 
the number of participating voices. While ambiguity is an authorial choice in a literary text – or at 
least mostly so, as I distinguish ambiguity from interpretative choices – it is often an unintended 
or conscious necessary consequence of drafting compromises and political wranglings, to be 
solved ex post facto by performative or forensic interpretation.
26
 
 
The distinction between the performative and forensic interpretation of the treaties, or of any 
legal text for that matter, which I offer here, constitutes a useful entry point into the argument 
made in this article. The argument departs from Nabokov‟s third grade of evil, which I have 
conceptualised as a sort of hermeneutic conformity. In order to better grasp both the distinction 
and the point of departure, it is useful to consider Wittgenstein‟s reflections on rule-following. In 
his Philosophical Investigations, he wrote: 
 
[T]here is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in 
what we call “obeying the rule” and “going against it” in actual cases. Hence there is an 
inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation. But we ought to 
restrict the term “interpretation” to the substitution of one expression of the rule for 
another.
27
 
 
The relevance of „practice‟ in rule-following of course needs to be adjusted to account for the fact 
that the performative interpretation (practice) outlined above is accomplished by those who wrote 
                                                     
25
 On the double role of states in this regards, see for example the Dissenting Opinion of Sir Franklin 
Berman in Empresas Lucchetti SA and Lucchetti Peru SA v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4, 
Annulment Decision, 5 September 2007, paras 9 ff.  
26
 Of course, paramount is also the consideration of the consequences of interpretation in a legal context as 
a normative environment, as opposed to a literary or generally communicative context, where the 
normative element is absent (there are no legal consequences to an incorrect interpretation). 
27
 Wittgenstein (1968) para. 201. The distinction made here between interpreting rules through their 
application and providing a linguistic (therefore system-internal) intepretation nicely maps on the 
distinction between performative and forensic intepretation, mutatis mutandis. 
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the rules – i.e. the „masters of the treaty.‟28 Additionally, and crucially, I do not mean to adopt the 
positivist stance, whereby rule-following as practice defeats the interpretativist position of law as 
an evaluative and therefore morally charged activity.
29
 What I mean to „salvage‟ from 
Wittgenstein‟s reflections is two-fold: on the one hand, his position on language, interpretation 
and rule-following as a form of practice, where interpretation, by itself, does not determine 
meaning;
30
 on the other, the concept of language game in connection with the forms of life, by 
which I take it that Wittgenstein intended a community of „shared understandings.‟31As Fuller 
remarked in his critical essay on Hart‟s positivism, „Wittgenstein‟s posthumous Philosophical 
Investigations constitutes a sort of running commentary on the way words shift and transform 
their meanings as they move from context to context.‟32 Fuller was interested in reaffirming the 
centrality of purpose, and therefore contingently of morality, in interpretation and in what he 
termed the „fidelity‟ to law, against a positivist approach. This conscious shift between meaning 
and purpose is arguably a two way street: just as one is required to consider context in order to 
interpret correctly any legal term, so equally any legal term comes weighed down by its original 
context when it is transplanted from one context to another. It is a common preoccupation of legal 
theorists, as the exchange between Hart and Fuller shows,
33
 to understand how meaning is 
affected by the legalisation and juridification of language.
34
 In Hart‟s famous example, what 
meaning can be attributed to the word „vehicle‟ in the legal rule forbidding to take vehicles in a 
                                                     
28
 It is also important to note that Wittgenstein was not concerned either with legal interpretation, nor with 
rule-following by judges (who are not obeying a rule, they are applying it); this crucial distinction is 
enough to cast doubt on the use of Wittgenstein to ground the positivist approach to interpretation, for 
which see the footnote below. 
29
 For the positivist „reading‟ of Wittgenstein‟s rule following, see A Marmor, Positive Law and Objective 
Values (Clarendon Press, 2001); T Endicott, „Putting Interpretation in Its Place,‟ 13 Law and Philosophy 
(1994) 451. A useful summary of the interpretativist position by S Bertea, „Remarks on a Legal Positivist 
Misuse of Wittgenstein‟s Later Philosophy,‟ 22 Law and Philosophy (2003) 513. 
30
 Wittgenstein (1968) para. 23: „Here the term “language-game” is meant to bring into prominence the 
fact that the speaking of a language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.‟ Ibidem, para. 202. Also, para. 
198: „any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. 
Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning.‟ 
31
 See Wittgenstein (1968) para. 241: „“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and 
what is false?” – It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. 
That is not an agreement in opinions but in form of life.‟ On the difference between form of life and forms 
of life in the Philosophical Investigations, I follow B Blix, „The Application (and Mis-Application) of 
Wittgenstein‟s Rule-Following Considerations to Legal Theory,‟ III(2) Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence (1990)107, 112, quoting R Haller: „Rudolf Haller has shown that Wittgenstein uses this 
phrase in at least two different ways: 1) (in the singular, Lebensform) to summarise “the common human 
way of acting”, that which is distinctly and universally human; and 2) (in the plural, Lebensformen) to 
emphasise diversity between societies and even between different communities within a single society.‟ It 
is equally important to maintain the distinction between contingent agreements on meaning and shared 
understandings derived from a common Lebensform; see Bix (1995) 16: „we must distinguish the 
agreements that partly constitute the meanings of particular terms and the background conditions of the 
natural world and social practices which are “the framework within which our language-games are played, 
not part of the games themselves.”‟ 
32
 L Fuller, „Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart,‟ 71 Harvard Law 
Review(1958)630, 669. 
33
 HLA Hart, „Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,‟ 71 Harvard Law Review (1958)593; for 
Fuller‟s rejoinder, see Fuller (1958).  
34
 By which I mean of course the use of language in a legal or judicial context. 
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public park?
35
 His equally famous formulation of a „core of settled meaning‟ and a „penumbra of 
debatable cases‟36 seems to straddle between linguistic interpretation and application of legal 
rules in a way that is not particularly helpful for those interested in the way language and 
meaning work in a legal context.
37
Neither, at least at this stage, is Fuller‟s retort helpful to our 
argument; his main point, that „[it is not possible] to interpret a word in a statute without knowing 
the aim of the statute‟38 is crucial to the thrust of his argument about morality, but takes for 
granted that contextual interpretation serves the purpose of understanding the meaning of a word 
in its legal context, without discounting the reality of that word in its wider „real world‟ context, 
or, in Wittgenstein‟s terms, in its form of life.39My point, rather, is that there is a process of de-
contextualisation and re-contextualisation when a word or a rule is transplanted from one legal 
context to another legal context – in the example I use in the next section, from the United States‟ 
constitutional jurisprudence to their IIAs.
40
  In this process, the conformism so lamented by 
Nabokov takes on a more sinister tinge, because in the process of interpreting the legal rule in 
compliance with the general rule of interpretation as detailed in the VCLT˗ and in a commercial 
context, as we have seen, this will normally take the form of a literal interpretation ˗ investment 
tribunals unwittingly or not transport its legal context. It is an act of deracination that goes 
beyond cultural blindness, of which for sure investment tribunals are also guilty. In fact, what I 
am describing is a process that has long taken place in international law, where general principles 
are normally distilled from domestic legal systems through a comparative analysis. As known to 
any international lawyer, the Statute of the International Court of Justice
41
 recognises these 
general principles as a source of law in its Article 38:  
 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes 
as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
42
 
 
                                                     
35
 Hart (1958)607. 
36
Ibidem. 
37
 As noted by Fuller (1958) 661-662. Fuller dismisses the notion that Hart might be simply referring to the 
difference between easy cases, where the application of the legal rule is clear-cut, and hard cases, when 
there is a penumbra of uncertainty, and rather prefers the explanation that words have a settled core and a 
penumbra of meaning, only to reject this as a mistaken assumption based on an overestimation of the value 
of individual words in the interpretative process. As an aside, in a passage immediately following one that 
is referred to by Hart in his article, and picked up by Fuller in his rejoinder, Wittgenstein notes: „…is a 
blurred concept a concept at all? – Is an indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all? Is it even an 
advantage to replace an indistinct picture with a sharp one? Isn‟t the indistinct one often exactly what we 
need?‟ See Wittgenstein (1968) para. 71. 
38
 Fuller (1958) 664. 
39
 A commoner way of considering this, especially in the scholarly context, is to refer to epistemic 
communities. Or at least, this is a stepping stone towards the transfer of a term from life to law. 
40
 For another example, see A Asteriti, „Social Dialogue, Laval-Style,‟ 5(2) European Journal of Legal 
Studies (2013)58, 78. 
41
 And the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice before it, Article 38. 
42
Statute of the International Court of Justice(1945) 1 UNTS993. 
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It is no secret that the presence of these general principles in most legal systems has more to do 
with legal colonisation than with any intrinsic commonality (even purged of the racialised 
„civilized nations‟ aspect), as acknowledged by C Wilfred Jenks, in his The Common Law of 
Mankind, so that it was clear, to any mid-20
th
 century international lawyer, that such commonality 
was the result of influence of the common and civil law systems.
43
 It was equally predictable for 
the popularity of these general principles to wane in the wake of the decolonisation movements, 
only to have a resurgence with the universalist language of human rights.
44
 
 
An example of a domestic constitutional principle undergoing a process of migration and 
globalisation to the point of acquiring potentially the status of general principle is the 
proportionality principle; originally developed in Germany and raised to the level of 
constitutional principle by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, proportionality analysis has been 
adopted across the world, not only by other constitutional courts (for example, in Canada, South 
Africa and Israel) but also by international courts, such as most prominently the European Court 
of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union.
45
 Interestingly, proportionality 
analysis has also reached the exclusive world of investment arbitration;
46
this process of diffusion 
has not been completely uncontroversial, and amongst the criticisms, the most pointed has been 
directed precisely at „boundary crossings‟ in a decontextualised and decontextualising fashion.47 
 
In the following case study, a narrower approach is taken, by considering how words migrate 
between legal regimes, and the problems of translation they both encounter and engender. 
Specifically, the case study focuses on provisions on indirect expropriation in the recent (2004 
and 2012) United States Model BITs. 
 
 
D. A case study: – the US model BIT’s annex on regulatory 
expropriation 
 
                                                     
43
 CW Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind (Praeger, 1958). On how the „general principles of law 
recognized by civilised nations‟ got to be inserted in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, see for example M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of 
International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 161-162.  
44
 For the use of general principles (seen as the expression of jus naturale) in a human rights context, see 
Judge AA Cançado-Trindade‟s Concurring Opinion in the Advisory Opinion Juridical Condition and 
Rights of Undocumented Migrants, OC-18/03 of September 17, 2003, Series A, No. 18, Sections IV-VI. 
45
 The literature on proportionality is, once again, vast. See by way of introduction, R Alexy, „On the 
structure of legal principles, 13(3) Ratio Juris (2000) 294. 
46
 See for example B Kingsbury and S Schill, „Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors‟ Rights with State 
Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest - The Concept of Proportionality‟, in S Schill (ed.)International 
Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) 75; more recently, A Stone 
Sweet and G della Cananea, „Proportionality, General Principles of Law, and Investor-State Arbitration: A 
Response to Jose Alvarez,‟ Yale Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 607, May 2014; available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2435307&download=yes (last visited 31 October 
2014). 
47
 JE Alvarez, „Beware: Boundary Crossings‟, forthcoming in T Kahana and A Schnicov (eds), Boundaries 
of Rights, Boundary of State, available at  
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/sela/Bewareboundarycrossings_nofootnotes_(2).pdf 
ESIL CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES  [VOL. 4 NO 1]  
[12] 
 
The protection against expropriation has traditionally been IIAs‟ raison d’être. In time, the 
criteria for identifying an expropriation have shifted, with indirect, or regulatory, expropriations 
becoming the cause of concern for investors and host states alike.
48
This shift in the object of the 
rule has not, until recently, generated an equal shift in the legal response, with the remedies for 
direct expropriations and nationalisations being considered applicable for regulatory 
expropriations as well;
49
 the attention has instead focused on the scope of the protection, i.e. on 
the distinction between non-compensable bona fide governmental actions, and compensable 
regulatory measures, where it is acknowledged that it would not be justifiable to burden only 
some property owners for measures enacted in pursuance of a legitimate public interest. As noted, 
IIAs have traditionally been quite laconic on the matter, normally not distinguishing between 
direct and indirect expropriation for the purposes of establishing liability.
50
As a consequence, a 
considerable amount of disquiet has been engendered by the application of the expropriation 
provision in the NAFTA in a series of arbitrations, exemplified by the remark made by the 
Canadian Judge who reviewed the notorious Metalclad Award, the most blatant case of 
successful indirect expropriation claim:  „The Tribunal gave an extremely broad definition of 
expropriation for the purposes of Article 1110. ....This definition is sufficiently broad to include a 
legitimate rezoning of property by a municipality or other zoning authority.‟51 
In 2004, in response to anxieties resulting from the first ten years of application of the NAFTA 
and its investment chapter, the United States and Canada introduced in their model BITs, by way 
of Annexes, a definition of regulatory expropriation.
52
 Annex B (Expropriation) of the US Model 
BIT provides as follows: 
 
The Parties confirm their shared understanding that:  
 
4. The second situation addressed by Article 6 [Expropriation and Compensation](1) is 
indirect expropriation, where an action or series of actions by a Party has an effect 
equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure.  
                                                     
(last visited 31 October 2014). 
48
 Indirect or regulatory expropriation can be defined as the effect on 
property of regulatory measures where there is neither transfer of title nor of value between the investor and 
the state. The topic has generated an immense literature; see by way of introduction UNCTAD, 
Expropriation, Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II (United Nations, 2012). 
49
The suggestion has been advanced to adjust the quantum of compensation for regulatory takings to reflect 
either contributory negligence by the investor, or the recognition of the legitimacy of the measures; see A 
Asteriti, „Regulatory Expropriation Claims in International Investment Arbitrations: A Bridge Too Far?,‟ in 
AK Bjorklund (ed.), Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2012-2013 (Oxford University 
Press, 2014) 451, 460. 
50
 See for example Article 5 of the 1990 United Kingdom – Argentina BIT: „Investments of investors of 
either Contracting Party shall not be nationalised, expropriated or subjected to measures having effect 
equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”) in the territory of 
the other Contracting Party except for a public purpose related to the internal needs of that Contracting 
Party on a non-discriminatory basis and against prompt, adequate and effective compensation.‟ 
51
The United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, 2001 BCSC 664, para. 100.  
52
 The clause is also added in the most recent version of the US Model BIT, the 2012 one, available at  
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf (last visited 31 
October 2014). 
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(a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a specific fact 
situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry 
that considers, among other factors:  
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action or series 
of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, 
standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred;  
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable 
investment-backed expectations; and  
(iii) the character of the government action.  
(b) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are 
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, 
safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations. 
53
 
 
The language of paragraphs 4(i) to (iii) is modelled on the United States Supreme Court‟s 
Judgment in Penn Central v. New York, where the Court set up the classic test for the factual ad 
hoc assessment of a regulatory takings claim concerning a partial taking.
54
 In it, the Court 
laconically stated:  
 
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court‟s decisions have 
identified several factors that have particular significance. The economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant 
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action.
55
 
 
The Court did not elaborate on the criteria, which have since engendered a considerable debate.
56
 
The most problematic of the criteria is the third listed by the Court, the character of the 
governmental action, as there is no agreement on what exactly that is, beyond a general fairness 
or due process requirement.
57
 
                                                     
53
 A similarly worded Annex is appended to the CAFTA‟s Investment Chapter, Annex 10-C. The model 
treaty was used for the US-Uruguay Treaty, entered into force in 2006, and the US-Rwanda Treaty, signed 
in 2008. 
54
Penn Central Transportation Co v. New York,438 US 104 (1978) (Penn Central). The Court was 
influenced by the theoretical grounding provided by F Michelman in his seminal article, “Property, Utility, 
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of „Just Compensation‟ Law” 80 Harvard Law Review 
(1967) 1165. 
55
Penn Central, supra,124 (emphasis added). 
56
 There is a vast bibliography on the Takings Clause and on the Penn Central Court‟s take on it; on the 
first, see for example R Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Harvard 
University Press, 1985) and R Epstein, Supreme Neglect. How to Revive Constitutional Protection for 
Private Property(Oxford University Press, 2008); on the second, RS Radford and LA Wake, „Deciphering 
and Extrapolating: Searching for Sense in Penn Central,‟ 38 Ecology Law Quarterly(2011) 731.  
57
 With reference to this criterion, the Court unhelpfully added that: “A „taking‟ may more readily be found 
when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, [citation 
omitted], than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of 
economic life to promote the common good.” Penn Central, 124. Such a statement seems to categorically 
exclude partial regulatory takings from the purview of the 5
th
 Amendment. A recent analysis of this 
criterion is in Lingle v. Chevron,544 US 528 (2005).  
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The Penn Central criteria have since been included in several IIAs; 
58
 through this inclusion, the 
Court‟s approach to regulatory takings might undergo a process of internationalisation and 
crystallisation, whereby it can evolve into a general customary law rule rather than special 
custom, similarly, mutatis mutandis,
59
 to the process undergone by the Hull standard of 
compensation, which went from expressing the position of the United States with respect to the 
Mexican expropriation policy to being included in most IIAs.
60
 
 
As an example of the deracination risk inherent to the migration of legal concepts across 
jurisdictions, the transposition of the „character‟ criterion from the jurisprudence of the US 
Supreme Court to the language of IIAs, which guaranteeaccess to international arbitration without 
the need to exhaust domestic remedies, is particularly troubling. Discussing the scope of the Penn 
Central character criterion, the Supreme Court quoted Justice Holmes‟ famous remark that 
„„...while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking‟61 commenting that „[…] [a] court cannot determine whether a regulation 
goes “too far” unless it knows how far the regulation goes.‟62 The Court quoted this famous 
dictum from Justice Holmes contextually to its treatment of the third Penn Central criterion to 
argue that the mode in which an administrative measure is implemented has to form part of its 
assessment and is crucial in determining the ripeness of the claim. The Court consequently argued 
that the ripeness of a claim might be dispositive, if the government has not had the chance to 
address the perceived wrong through the appropriate administrative and judicial remedies. Even 
discounting the problem of conceptualising investment tribunals as international judicial review 
panels,
63
how are tribunals supposed to interpret the reference to the „character‟ of the 
measure?Claims of regulatory expropriation would by definition never be ripeas this is 
interpreted in US jurisprudence, since IIAs do not normally require the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies in order to establish the admissibility of a claim neither do they impose other regulatory 
                                                     
58
 Annex B of the 2004 US Model BIT; Annex B.13(1) of the 2004 Canada Model BIT; Annex 3 of the 
India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement; Annex 10-C of the CAFTA-DR; 
Article 5(b) of the Indian Model BIPA; Annex 10-D of the Chile-US FTA; Annex 11-B of the Australia-US 
FTA; Annex 2.3 of the 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement. On the influence of takings 
jurisprudence and its constitutionalization in international investment law, see D Schneiderman, 
Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization,(Cambridge University Press, 2008) Chapter 2.  
59
 Hull‟s statement was in the context of an international dispute, and it was meant to illustrate what he 
thought the customary rule on expropriation was (or ought to be); the Penn Central criteria originate in 
domestic constitutional law. Nonetheless, it is precisely the goal of the US to transfer its jurisprudence on 
to the international plane, in response to generally expressed anxieties about the possibility that the US „no 
greater rights‟ doctrine is not respected and foreign investors under the NAFTA are granted more rights 
than US investors under the US Constitution; see Schneiderman  (2008) 73-74, and the conclusions of the 
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 USC §§ 3803–3805 (2002). 
60
 US Secretary of State Cordell Hull‟s statement was in response to a note by the Mexican Foreign 
Secretary on the existence in international law of the requirement of compensation for “expropriations of a 
general and impersonal character.” Excerpt of Hull‟s statement in M Whiteman, (ed.), Digest of 
International Law,vol. 8 (Government Printing Office, 1967) 1020. 
61
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US 393 (1922). 
62
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 US (2001). 
63
 As advocated by Thomas Wälde in his Separate Opinion in International Thunderbird Gaming 
Corporation v. United Mexican States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award,January 26, 2006, para. 37.  
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ripeness requirements.
64
 This aporetic circumstance points to the dangers of extrapolating 
language that is organic to the system that generated it; this deracinationof the law, intended as 
uprooting, goes beyond cultural differences.
65
 It is the point of the act of uprooting to deny the 
very significance of cultural differences, in a typical hegemonic move. In other words, the 
„character‟ criterion as assessed by the US Supreme Court serves, amongst others, the purpose in 
American constitutional jurisprudence to assess the ripeness of a claim and to give the 
government the chance to remedy an administrative malpractice or an incorrect decision without 
engaging issues of constitutional significance. In an international arbitration, this function is 
completely lost, as the ripeness of the claim has nothing to do with the iter of the claim in the 
domestic courts; an investor‟s claim can be escalated immediately from the local level to the 
constitutional level of an investment arbitration, where, instead of acting as a protection of 
governmental measures against unripe claims, the criterion is used to assess those same measures 
against other, vaguely defined standards of appropriateness and legitimacy. This is by no means 
an indictment of a comparative approach to the development of international rules; neither is it 
meant to indicate that the adoption of American takings jurisprudence will automatically result in 
a decrease in host States‟ regulatory power. In fact, the Chemtura Tribunal, while applying the 
NAFTA‟s Chapter 11, seemed influenced by the US Model BIT, which adopts the Penn Station 
criteria for regulatory takings. And yet, the Tribunal decided against the investor, finding that the 
regulatory action did not meet the „substantial deprivation‟ test; in an important obiter dictum, the 
Tribunal clarified that, had the deprivation been substantial, the claim would have nonetheless 
failed on a police powers exception, which would have relieved Canada of its obligation to pay 
compensation.
66
 The dictum reflects Annex B of the 2004 US Model BIT.  
 
These comments are only meant to keep us alive to the dangers of too easy an adoption of criteria 
devised for other systems of adjudication, and constitutional ones especially. It has been argued 
                                                     
64
 The majority of IIAs allowing for the arbitration of investment disputes, and the ICSID Convention, are 
lex specialis for what concerns the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies. As an example of the tension 
between the „ripeness requirement‟ in US takings law and the procedural requirements of NAFTA; see V 
Been and JC Beauvais, „The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA‟s Investment Protections and the 
Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine,‟ 78 New York University Law 
Review(2003) 30, 83 ff. See also what the Tribunal had to say in Glamis Gold Ltd. v. The United States of 
America, UNCITRAL, Award, 16 May 2009, paras 330 ff.  
65
I should note that some IIAS and FTAs introduce extra text to explain and clarify what is meant by 
character; for example, the 2008 ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA contains the following clarification 
at Article 1(c) of the Annex on Expropriation and Compensation: „the character of the government action, 
including its objective and whether the action is disproportionate to the public purpose.‟ Others, like the 
2007 Japan-Chile Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, add that one element is the non-
discrimination requirement (Annex ((b)(iii). Nonetheless, it should be added that, 1) just as many 
instruments do not add any clarification; 2) the original US wording can be imported through the MFN 
clause in other instruments; and, 3) these additions confirm rather than disprove the potential hegemonic 
pull of the US version. 
66
 At para. 266 of the Award: „Irrespective of the existence of a contractual deprivation, the Tribunal 
considers in any event that the measures challenged by the Claimant constituted a valid exercise of the 
Respondent‟s police powers. As discussed in detail in connection with Article 1105 of NAFTA, the PMRA 
took measures within its mandate, in a non-discriminatory manner, motivated by an increasing awareness 
of the dangers presented by lindane for human health and the environment. A measure adopted under such 
circumstances is a valid exercise of the State‟s police powers and, as a result, does not constitute an 
expropriation‟.  
ESIL CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES  [VOL. 4 NO 1]  
[16] 
 
that the Penn Central criteria found their place in U.S. investment instruments in order to 
minimise the risk that foreign investors would have access to higher protection than that available 
to U.S. citizens.
67
 Be that as it may, it certainly constitutes an attempt by the U.S. legislature to 
„imprint‟ constitutional jurisprudence into international protections against regulatory 
expropriations, where these might affect the rights of American citizens against the rights granted 
to foreigners. 
 
The first application of the regulatory expropriation criteria derived from the Penn Central test by 
an arbitration tribunal is in the RDC Award, delivered in June 2012.
68
 The dispute concerned a 
concession agreement for the provision of railway services in Guatemala. One of the contracts 
was the object of a Lesivo Declaration by the Guatemalan Government, which the claimant 
argued had amounted to an indirect expropriation of the contractual rights.
69
 In its analysis, the 
Tribunal performed the classic ad hoc enquiry familiar to scholars of Fifth Amendment case law, 
in order to ascertain if the Lesivo Declaration‟s character, purpose and interference with 
investment-backed expectations amounted to an indirect expropriation of the investment. 
Notwithstanding the detailed review of the facts, the conclusion reached by the Tribunal, that the 
Lesivo Declaration did not amount to an indirect expropriation, depended almost exclusively on 
the effect, which the Tribunal determined “not to rise to the level of an indirect expropriation.”70 
 
It is noteworthy that the Tribunal did not make an argument on analogy with the US 
jurisprudence from which the criteria originate, nor did it cite US cases as authority, despite 
having adopted the methodology that both underpins and logically results from the criteria as 
worded in US law. Its approach, relying on the ordinary meaning of the treaty terms without any 
further inquiry into their domestic origin, is in accordance with the general rule of interpretation 
as per Article 31 of the VCLT; however, it might nonetheless mask an interpretation that is 
dependent on the original meaning of the terms as used in a US constitutional context, without 
any jurisprudential support or explicit recognition. 
 
 
 
                                                     
67
 In compliance of the Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, according to which: „....Recognizing that 
United States law on the whole provides a high level of protection for investment, consistent with or greater 
than the level required by international law, the principal negotiating objectives of the United States 
regarding foreign investment are to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting barriers to foreign 
investment, while ensuring that foreign investors in the United States are not accorded greater substantive 
rights with respect to investment protections than United States investors in the United States, and to secure 
for investors important rights comparable to those that would be available under United States legal 
principles and practice...‟ (19 USC 3801, § 2012(b)(3). 
68
Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Award, June 
29, 2012 (RDC). 
69
 A lesivo is a “measure adopted by the executive branch where the Government agrees to declare [a] 
[c]ontract [...] lesivo because it causes harm to the State, and instructs and authorizes the Attorney General 
to take measures to cease its obligatory character.” RDC, para. 33.  
70
RDC, para. 56.  
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E. Concluding remarks 
 
This article aims to open the discussion on an issue that I consider of great importance, i.e. the 
interpretation of treaty terms across legal regimes and jurisprudential cultures, and takes as an 
example the adoption of the US constitutional jurisprudence in the US Model BITs. As is well 
known, the presence in most IIAs of Most-Favoured-Nations clauses allows provisions to travel 
across treaties, so that a clause in a US treaty might be invoked by investors in a dispute arising 
under another treaty altogether, increasing the likelihood of individual clauses  being incorporated 
in numerous other IIAs. The article points to the risk of deracination of language that is intrinsic 
to such processes of transmigration. Nabokov identified conformity as the greatest evil in literary 
translation. In investment arbitration, the apparent conformity of investment arbitrators adopting a 
literal approach to interpretation – conformity to the interpretative culture of commercial 
arbitration – hides a more dangerous conformity to the semantic hegemony of US legal culture. 
Contextually, the article argues for a careful and attentive consideration of the words in their 
context, and the effect that their transfer into another legal context has to their meaning, beyond 
the simplistic dichotomy between literal and teleologic interpretation, and taking into due account 
the diverse constitutional traditions that generated them. 
 
 
